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Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity

Author

Listed:
  • Nadine Chlaß

    () (Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany)

  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany)

  • Topi Miettinen

    (SITE Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.)

Abstract

Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.

Suggested Citation

  • Nadine Chlaß & Werner Güth & Topi Miettinen, 2009. "Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-069, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-069
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    File URL: http://zs.thulb.uni-jena.de/receive/jportal_jparticle_00153880
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    Cited by:

    1. Chlaß, Nadine & Riener, Gerhard, 2015. "Lying, Spying, Sabotaging -- Balancing Means and Aims --," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113222, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Güth, Werner, 2014. "Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 389-395.
    3. Chlaß, Nadine & Riener, Gerhard, 2015. "Lying, spying, sabotaging : procedures and consequences," Working Papers 15-18, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    4. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 433-450, September.
    5. Sausgruber, Rupert & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2014. "Discriminatory taxes are unpopular—Even when they are efficient and distributionally fair," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 463-476.
    6. Dold, Malte & Khadjavi, Menusch, 2017. "Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 127-137.
    7. Nadine Chlaß & Peter G. Moffatt, 2017. "Giving in Dictator Games - Experimenter Demand Effect or Preference over the Rules of the Game?," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-044, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    8. Mertins Vanessa & Albert Max, 2015. "Does Participation Increase Outcome Acceptance? Evidence from a Power-to-take Experiment," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 235(6), pages 584-607, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    procedural preferences; experiment; procedural fairness;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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