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Endogenous Community Formation and Collective Provision - A Procedurally Fair Mechanism

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  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

Abstract

A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining endogenously who participates in collective provision, which projects are implemented, and the positive or negative payments due to the participating members. We justify and discuss this procedural fairness approach and compare it with that of optimal, e.g. welfaristic game theoretic mechanism design (e.g. Myerson, 1979).

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth, 2013. "Endogenous Community Formation and Collective Provision - A Procedurally Fair Mechanism," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-013, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simona Cicognani & Anna D’Ambrosio & Werner Güth & Simone Pfuderer & Matteo Ploner, 2015. "Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 109-132, January.
    2. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    3. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality," CESifo Working Paper Series 4541, CESifo.
    4. Chlaß, Nadine & Güth, Werner & Miettinen, Topi, 2019. "Purely procedural preferences - Beyond procedural equity and reciprocity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 108-128.
    5. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    6. Güth, Werner & Vittoria Levati, M. & Montinari, Natalia, 2014. "Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 206-221.
    7. Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2012. "Public projects benefiting some and harming others: three experimental studies," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    8. Gary E Bolton & Jordi Brandts & Axel Ockenfels, 2005. "Fair Procedures: Evidence from Games Involving Lotteries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1054-1076, October.
    9. Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality," CESifo Working Paper Series 4541, CESifo.
    10. Werner Gueth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2013. "Fairness That Money Can Buy. Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 4(65), May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Procedural fairness; Mechanism design; Equality axiom; Public provision; Collective action;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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