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Fairness That Money Can Buy - Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice

Author

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  • Werner Güth

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)

  • Hartmut Kliemt

Abstract

We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of "self-governance". Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced. They guarantee that all realized changes of a status quo are in an "objective" (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. Some empirical evidence that procedurally fair bidding can promote communitarian co-operation rather than crowding it out, is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration, though.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2013. "Fairness That Money Can Buy - Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-003, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-003
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    File URL: http://www2.wiwi.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2013/wp_2013_003.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2012. "Public projects benefiting some and harming others: three experimental studies," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    2. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, December.
    3. Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. "The Calculus of Consent after Thirty Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 341-353, June.
    4. Satz, Debra, 2010. "Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195311594.
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    Cited by:

    1. Güth, Werner, 2014. "Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 389-395.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fair Procedures; Egalitarian Mechanisms; Unanimity; Constitutional Political Economy; Non-State Communities; Governing the Commons; Crowding out;

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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