Fairness That Money Can Buy - Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice
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Other versions of this item:
- Werner Gueth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2013. "Fairness That Money Can Buy. Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 4(65), May.
References listed on IDEAS
- Werner Güth & Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2012. "Public projects benefiting some and harming others: three experimental studies," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
- Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. "The Calculus of Consent after Thirty Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 341-353, June.
- Satz, Debra, 2010. "Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195311594.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Güth, Werner, 2014.
"Endogenous community formation and collective provision – A procedurally fair mechanism,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 389-395.
- Werner Güth, 2013. "Endogenous Community Formation and Collective Provision - A Procedurally Fair Mechanism," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-013, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
More about this item
KeywordsFair Procedures; Egalitarian Mechanisms; Unanimity; Constitutional Political Economy; Non-State Communities; Governing the Commons; Crowding out;
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2013-01-19 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2013-01-19 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2013-01-19 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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