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`Choice' in collective decision-making processes: Instrumental or expressive approval?

  • Jones, Philip
  • Dawson, Peter

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics).

Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 102-117

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Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:36:y:2007:i:1:p:102-117
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  1. David Fielding,, . "The Social and Economic Determinants of Voter Behaviour: Evidence from the 1992 General Election in Scotland," Discussion Papers 97/1, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
  2. Warr, Peter G., 1982. "Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 131-138, October.
  3. Philip Jones & John Cullis, 2002. "Merit Want Status and Motivation: The Knight Meets the Self-Loving Butcher, Brewer, and Baker," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(2), pages 83-101, March.
  4. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 2003. "Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 48(Jun).
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  6. Brennan, Geoffrey & Pincus, Jonathan J, 1983. "Government Expenditure Growth and Resource Allocation: The Nebulous Connection," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 351-65, November.
  7. Tollison, Robert D, 2001. "The Interest-Group Theory of Government: Problems and Prospects," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2-3), pages 465-72.
  8. Blais, Andre & Young, Robert, 1999. " Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in Rationality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 39-55, April.
  9. Jones, Philip & Hudson, John, 2000. "Civic Duty and Expressive Voting: Is Virtue Its Own Reward?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 3-16.
  10. Frank, Robert H, 1997. "The Frame of Reference as a Public Good," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1832-47, November.
  11. Swank, O H & Eisinga, R, 1999. " Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-party System: An Application to the Netherlands," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(3-4), pages 195-213, December.
  12. Charles Pattie & Ron Johnston, 2001. "A Low Turnout Landslide: Abstention at the British General Election of 1997," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 49(2), pages 286-305, 06.
  13. Gramlich, Edward M & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1982. "Micro Estimates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(3), pages 536-60, June.
  14. Carter, John R & Guerette, Stephen D, 1992. " An Experimental Study of Expressive Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 251-60, April.
  15. Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard, 1986. "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 728-41, September.
  16. Hudson, John & Jones, Philip R., 1994. "The importance of the 'ethical voter': An estimate of 'altruism'," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 499-509, October.
  17. Loewenstein, George, 1999. "Because It Is There: The Challenge of Mountaineering . . . for Utility Theory," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 315-43.
  18. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
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  20. Stephen T. Ziliak & Deirdre N. McCloskey, 2004. "Size Matters: The Standard Error of Regressions in the American Economic Review," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 1(2), pages 331-358, August.
  21. Fisher, Ronald C, 1985. "Taxes and Expenditures in the U.S.: Public Opinion Surveys and Incidence Analysis Compared," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(3), pages 525-50, July.
  22. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February.
  23. Gemmell, Norman & Morrissey, Oliver & Pinar, Abuzer, 2003. "Tax perceptions and the demand for public expenditure: evidence from UK micro-data," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 793-816, November.
  24. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
  25. Schofield, Normal, et al, 1998. " Multiparty Electoral Competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A Model Based on Multinomial Probit," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 257-93, December.
  26. Barr, Nicholas, 2004. "Economics of the Welfare State," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 4, number 9780199264971.
  27. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  28. Culyer, A J, 1971. "The Nature of the Commodity 'Health Care' and Its Efficient Allocation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(2), pages 189-211, July.
  29. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-47, March.
  30. Stigler, George J, 1970. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, April.
  31. Jones, Philip R & Cullis, John G & Lewis, Alan, 1998. "Public versus Private Provision of Altruism: Can Fiscal Policy Make Individuals 'Better' People?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 3-24.
  32. Ziliak, Stephen T. & McCloskey, Deirdre N., 2004. "Size matters: the standard error of regressions in the American Economic Review," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 527-546, November.
  33. Cummings, Ronald G, et al, 1997. "Are Hypothetical Referenda Incentive Compatible?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(3), pages 609-21, June.
  34. Ashenfelter, Orley C & Kelley, Stanley, Jr, 1975. "Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 695-733, December.
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