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‘All for One and One for All’: Transactions Cost and Collective Action

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  • Philip Jones

Abstract

Rational choice analysis of collective action predicts that individual members of a large group will not contribute voluntarily towards a common cause; members of large groups attribute no significance to individual action. Large groups are mobilised by the attraction of private goods and services; private interest, rather than identity with a common cause, is the stimulus. Yet the efficacy of such selective incentives depends on the signal that erstwhile ‘profits’ (from the provision of private goods) are dedicated to achieving a collective goal. At the same time, the signal that collective action is ‘non‐profit’ enhances the intrinsic value of the act of participation. When the impact of individual action on outcome is difficult to discern, individuals rely on low‐cost signals relating to process. There are incentives to identify with the pursuit of a common cause when collective action is deemed ‘non‐profit’ and a common goal is non‐rival.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Jones, 2004. "‘All for One and One for All’: Transactions Cost and Collective Action," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 52(3), pages 450-468, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:52:y:2004:i:3:p:450-468
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00490.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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