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Intrinsic Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action: The Impact of Selective Incentives

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  • Andreas P. Kyriacou

Abstract

I integrate the notion of intrinsic motivation, applied to economics most notably by Frey (1997), into the logic of individual contributions toward collective goods as analyzed since Olson ([1965] 1971). This illuminates the many and various ways through which the intrinsic motivation to contribute toward such goods can be crowded out by the application of selective incentives. I suggest that the crowding‐out effect increases the cost to society of organizing the provision of collective goods and argue in favor of designing selective incentives that mitigate this effect.

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  • Andreas P. Kyriacou, 2010. "Intrinsic Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action: The Impact of Selective Incentives," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 823-839, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:823-839
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2010.00722.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Vaidyanatha, Abhi & Charness, Gary, 2020. "In-group identification and motivation crowding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 866-874.
    2. Narloch, Ulf & Pascual, Unai & Drucker, Adam G., 2012. "Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards: Experimental Insights from Andean Farming Communities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 2096-2107.
    3. Andreas P. Kyriacou, 2011. "Rational Irrationality and Group Size: The Effect of Biased Beliefs on Individual Contributions Towards Collective Goods," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 109-130, January.
    4. Lu Gram & Rolando Granados & Eva M. Krockow & Nayreen Daruwalla & David Osrin, 2021. "Modelling collective action to change social norms around domestic violence: social dilemmas and the role of altruism," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 8(1), pages 1-15, December.

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