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Motivation and sorting in open source software innovation

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  • Belenzon, Sharon
  • Schankerman, Mark

Abstract

This paper studies the role of intrinsic motivation, reputation, and reciprocity in driving open source software innovation. Unlike previous literature based on survey data, we exploit the observed pattern of contributions - the .revealed preference. of developers - to infer the underlying incentives driving the decision to contribute source code. Using detailed information on code contributions and project membership, we classify software developers into distinct types and study how contributions from each developer type vary according to the open source license type and other project characteristics. We find that developers strongly sort by license type, project size, and corporate sponsorship, and that reciprocity is important only for a small subset of projects. We also show that contributions have a substantial impact on the performance of open source projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Belenzon, Sharon & Schankerman, Mark, 2008. "Motivation and sorting in open source software innovation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51594, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:51594
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Fackler & Nadzeya Laurentsyeva, 2020. "Gravity in Online Collaborations: Evidence from GitHub," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 21(03), pages 15-20, September.
    2. Abou El-Komboz, Lena & Fackler, Thomas, 2022. "Productivity Spillovers among Knowledge Workers in Agglomerations: Evidence from GitHub," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264083, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Matthias Walther, 2010. "Corruption in Open-Source Software Organisations: A Theoretical Framework," Working Papers halshs-00690332, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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