An Economistic Interpretation of the Northern Ireland Conflict
Tullock (1971) demonstrated that the cause of politial rebellion is perhaps more to do with private expected utility that collective discontent. There is much to suggest that pecuniary motivation plays a large part in the North Irland (N.I.) conflict given the substantial amount of black market activity which is present. This paper therefore puts forward an economic model in the N.I. paramilitaries blending their gangster and political activities which are commonly geared to earn revenue.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: U.K.; University of Portsmouth; Department of Economics, Locksway Road, Milton, Southsea Hants PO4 8JF, UK|
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Web page: http://www.pbs.port.ac.uk/econ/index.html
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