IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/scotjp/v45y1998i3p294-308.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An Economistic Interpretation of the Northern Ireland Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Jennings, Colin C

Abstract

Tullock (1971) argued that the cause of political rebellion is related more to private expected utility than collective discontent. There is much to suggest that secondary motivation plays a large part in the Northern Ireland conflict. Given the substantial amount of 'black market' activity which is present. This paper therefore puts forward a model of the NI paramilitaries blending their gangster and political activities which are commonly geared to earn revenue. From this model an explanation from an economic perspective emerges as to why a cease-fire may occur and why it is unstable. The implications of the model are then investigated, with particular reference to conflict solutions arising from the economic model rather than political diplomacy. Copyright 1998 by Scottish Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Jennings, Colin C, 1998. "An Economistic Interpretation of the Northern Ireland Conflict," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 45(3), pages 294-308, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:294-308
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=sjpe&volume=45&issue=3&year=1998&part=null
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:45:y:1998:i:3:p:294-308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sesssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.