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Deficits, Debt, and Democracy

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  • Richard E. Wagner

Abstract

This timely book reveals that the budget deficits and accumulating debts that plague modern democracies reflect a clash between two rationalities of governance: one of private property and one of common property. The clashing of these rationalities at various places in society creates forms of societal tectonics that play out through budgeting. The book demonstrates that while this clash is an inherent feature of democratic political economy, it can nonetheless be limited through embracing once again a constitution of liberty.

Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab

Suggested Citation

  • Richard E. Wagner, 2012. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14477.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:14477
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Boettke & Alain Marciano, 2015. "The past, present and future of Virginia Political Economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 53-65, April.
    2. Richard Wagner & Deema Yazigi, 2014. "Form vs. substance in selection through competition: elections, markets, and political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 503-514, June.
    3. Eisl, Andreas, 2017. "Explaining variation in public debt: A quantitative analysis of the effects of governance," MaxPo Discussion Paper Series 17/1, Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo).
    4. Marta Podemska-Mikluch & Richard Wagner, 2013. "Dyads, triads, and the theory of exchange: Between liberty and coercion," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 171-182, June.
    5. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/67pdgvv1o1924au1fvpb4bng12 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Richard Wagner, 2012. "Rationality, political economy, and fiscal responsibility: wrestling with tragedy on the fiscal commons," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 261-277, September.
    7. Daniel J. Smith, 2019. "Giuseppe Eusepi, Richard E. Wagner: Public debt: An illusion of democratic political economy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(2), pages 185-188, June.
    8. Peter J. Boettke & Alexander W. Salter & Daniel J. Smith, 2018. "Money as meta-rule: Buchanan’s constitutional economics as a foundation for monetary stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 529-555, September.
    9. Richard Wagner, 2012. "The Calculus of Consent: a compass for my professional journey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 393-396, September.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/67pdgvv1o1924au1fvpb4bng12 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    12. Eileen Norcross & Paul Dragos Aligica, 2020. "Catholic Social Thought and New Institutional Economics: An Assessment of Their Affinities and Areas of Potential Convergence," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(4), pages 1241-1269, September.
    13. Rui Nuno Baleiras, 2014. "Towards predictability and sustainability of public finances: a commentary on 'Control of the Central Government Budget Outturn'," CFP Occasional Papers 02/2014, Portuguese Public Finance Council.
    14. Geoffrey Lea & Adam Martin, 2014. "From Vienna to Virginia: Exchange, rules, and social cooperation an introduction to the symposium," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 1-9, March.
    15. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Sovereignty as exchange of political property rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 79-96, October.
    16. Richard Wagner, 2014. "James Buchanan’s public debt theory: a rational reconstruction," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 253-264, September.
    17. Christopher J. Coyne & Courtney Michaluk & Rachel Reese, 2016. "Unproductive entrepreneurship in US military contracting," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 5(2), pages 221-239, August.
    18. Peter Lewin, 2015. "Richard W. Wagner: Mind, Society and Human Action: Time and Knowledge in a Theory of Social Economy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 357-359, September.
    19. Michael David Thomas, 2019. "Reapplying behavioral symmetry: public choice and choice architecture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 11-25, July.
    20. Andreas Eisl, 2017. "Explaining Variation in Public Debt," Working Papers hal-02187805, HAL.
    21. Richard Wagner, 2012. "Viennese kaleidics: Why it’s liberty more than policy that calms turbulence," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 283-297, December.
    22. Diana W. Thomas, 2018. "A process perspective on regulation: Who bears the dispersed costs of regulation?," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 395-402, December.
    23. Alexander William Salter & Andrew T. Young, 2019. "Polycentric Sovereignty: The Medieval Constitution, Governance Quality, and the Wealth of Nations," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1241-1253, June.
    24. Krzysztof Beck & Michał Możdżeń, 2020. "Institutional Determinants of Budgetary Expenditures. A BMA-Based Re-Evaluation of Contemporary Theories for OECD Countries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(10), pages 1-31, May.

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    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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