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Deficits, Debt, and Democracy

Author

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  • Richard E. Wagner

Abstract

This timely book reveals that the budget deficits and accumulating debts that plague modern democracies reflect a clash between two rationalities of governance: one of private property and one of common property. The clashing of these rationalities at various places in society creates forms of societal tectonics that play out through budgeting. The book demonstrates that while this clash is an inherent feature of democratic political economy, it can nonetheless be limited through embracing once again a constitution of liberty.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard E. Wagner, 2012. "Deficits, Debt, and Democracy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14477, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:14477
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Boettke & Alain Marciano, 2015. "The past, present and future of Virginia Political Economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 53-65, April.

    More about this item

    Book Chapters

    The following chapters of this book are listed in IDEAS

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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