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Form vs. substance in selection through competition: elections, markets, and political economy

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  • Richard Wagner
  • Deema Yazigi

Abstract

Any competitive process selects among qualities possessed by the competitors, and with different processes selecting for different qualities. While the competitive form is universal, the substantive qualities that are selected depend on the particular environment within which competition occurs. With respect to athletic competition, for instance, diving selects for different qualities than swimming: a champion diver need not be a champion swimmer. Markets and politics are both forms of competitive endeavor, and it is reasonable to think that competition will select for excellence within each environment. This purely formal property of competition, however, generates different substantive qualities across environments, as we explore in this paper. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Wagner & Deema Yazigi, 2014. "Form vs. substance in selection through competition: elections, markets, and political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 503-514, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:3:p:503-514
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0065-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. David J. Hebert & Richard E. Wagner, 2015. "Political Parties as Interest Groups," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001246, UCLA Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Formal vs. substantive rationality; Selection of qualities; Competitive selection; Markets vs. elections; Environmental rationality; Ecological rationality; Generative analysis; Evolutionary political economy; B52; D23; D83; L33; P26;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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