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Bargaining and Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Dan Usher

    () (Queen's Unversity)

Abstract

Government by majority rule voting requires that compromise be attainable, but not too easily. Little of the nation's business could be transacted without an ability on the part of the legislators and political parties to strike bargains, but government by majority rule voting could not withstand a bargaining equilibrium comparable to the general equilibrium in a competitive economy. Democratic government is designed to foster bargaining where it should be fostered and to impede bargaining where it should be impeded.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Usher, 2010. "Bargaining and Voting," Working Papers 1245, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1245
    as

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    File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1245.pdf
    File Function: First version 2010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dan Usher, 2012. "Bargaining unexplained," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 23-41, April.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    4. Dan Usher, 1994. "The Significance of the Probabilistic Voting Theorem," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(2), pages 433-445, May.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:01:p:85-104_19 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    7. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, April.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:74:y:1980:i:02:p:432-446_16 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:76:y:1982:i:04:p:753-766_18 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Dan Usher, 2005. "Assessing the citizen – candidate model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 43-65, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Wagner & Deema Yazigi, 2014. "Form vs. substance in selection through competition: elections, markets, and political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 503-514, June.
    2. Dan Usher, 2012. "Bargaining unexplained," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 23-41, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Majority rule voting;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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