Three Papers on Bargaining
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References listed on IDEAS
- Dan Usher, 2012. "Bargaining unexplained," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 23-41, April.
- Blackorby,Charles & Bossert,Walter & Donaldson,David J., 2005.
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More about this item
Keywordsbargaining; voting; fairness; equilibrium;
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-05-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-05-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2010-05-29 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2010-05-29 (Labour Economics)
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