Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism
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- Albert Breton & Pierre Salmon, 2003. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics: their effects on secessionism," Post-Print hal-00445598, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsconstitutional economics; political competition; secessionism;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2003-05-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2003-05-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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