An enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of states and governmental units
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- Hausken, Kjell & Knutsen, John F., 2010. "An enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of states and governmental units," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 4, pages 1-38.
- Kjell Hausken & John F. Knutsen, 2004. "An Enabling Mechanism for the Creation, Adjustment, and Dissolution of States and Governmental Units," Public Economics 0409011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsTerritorial units; individual liberty; individual decision making; individual welfare; competitive markets; public choice; governmental units; endogenous determination of borders; constitutional economics; political economy;
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-03-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2010-03-06 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-03-06 (Positive Political Economics)
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