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As the People Want It, Blueprint for a New Confederation


  • John F Knutsen


Presents a complete and detailed constitutional framework applying the rational self-interest model and market mechanisms to intra and inter- governmental behaviour and collective decisions. In particular, the paper presents an enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment and dissolution of governmental units and a mechanism for allocating tasks between units as well as a mechanism for reallocating funding. The emphasis is on practical enabling mechanisms rather than theoretical models.

Suggested Citation

  • John F Knutsen, 2004. "As the People Want It, Blueprint for a New Confederation," Public Economics 0402004, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0402004
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 187. scanned from original paper document

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. Stephen Morris, 2001. "Political Correctness," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April.
    3. Roland Benabou & Guy Laroque, 1992. "Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 921-958.
    4. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001. "A Model of Expertise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775.
    5. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    6. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August.
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:03:p:566-581_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Joel Sobel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 557-573.
    9. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    10. Lagerlof, Johan, 1997. "Lobbying, information, and private and social welfare," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 615-637, September.
    11. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-292, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hausken, Kjell & Knutsen, John F., 2010. "An enabling mechanism for the creation, adjustment, and dissolution of states and governmental units," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 4, pages 1-38.
    2. Kjell Hausken & John F. Knutsen, 2002. "The Birth, Adjustment and Death of States," Public Economics 0205004, EconWPA.

    More about this item


    government; territorial units; public choice; constitutional economics; political economy; individual liberty; direct democracy; popular sovereignty; confederation; federation; Europe; constitutional law;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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