Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangement
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Other versions of this item:
- Pierre Salmon, 1999.
"Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements
[Elections ordinaires et aménagements constitutionnels]," Working Papers hal-01526528, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- William Niskanen, 1990. "Conditions affecting the survivial of constitutional rules," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 53-62, March.
- Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
- James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
- Russell Hardin, 1990. "Contractarianism: Wistful thinking," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 35-52, March.
- Salmon, Pierre, 1987.
"Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme,"
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,
Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
- SALMON, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralization as an incentive scheme," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
- Steven Maser, 1985. "Demographic factors affecting constitutional decisions: the case of municipal charters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 121-162, January.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Peter Ordeshook, 1992. "Constitutional stability," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 137-175, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- BRETON, Albert & SALMON, Pierre, 2002.
"Constitutional rules and competitive politics : their effects on secessionism,"
LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003)
2002-06, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
- Albert Breton & Pierre Salmon, 2003. "Constitutional rules and competitive politics: their effects on secessionism," Post-Print hal-00445598, HAL.
- Pierre Salmon, 2001.
"Constitutional Implications of Electoral Assumptions,"
Constitutional Political Economy,
Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 333-349, December.
- Pierre Salmon, 2001. "Constitutional Implications of electoral assumptions," Post-Print hal-00445605, HAL.
More about this item
Keywordsconstitutional economics; elections; constitutional change; économie constitutionnelle; élections; changements constitutionnels;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
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