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Transfert de compétences et réallocation du capital social à la disposition des collectivités territoriales

  • Pierre Salmon

[eng] Transfer of powers and reallocation of the social capital available to junior governments The article starts from the assumption that the production of junior governments in sub­central jurisdictions such as the departement or the region is related both to the powers or resources that they receive from the central government and to the social capital which is available to them. A model is proposed in which both elements are considered as factors of production. The second being able to move only slowly across levels of jurisdiction, the central government is itself unable to transfer rapidly powers or resources from one level to another without running the risk of an efficiency loss of the whole which it would find unacceptable in terms of electoral support. [fre] Transfert de compétences et réallocation du capital social à la disposition des collectivités territoriales L'article part de l'hypothèse que la production de collectivités territoriales comme le département et la région dépend à la fois des compétences ou des res­sources qui leur sont attribuées par l'État et du capital social accumulé dont elles peuvent disposer. Un modèle est présenté dans lequel ces deux éléments sont considérés comme des facteurs de production. Le second ne pouvant passer d'une collectivité d'un certain niveau à une collectivité d'un autre niveau que lentement, l'État ne peut lui-même transférer rapidement des compétences ou des ressources d'un niveau à l'autre sans risquer une perte d'efficacité de l'ensemble qui serait, pour lui, électoralement inacceptable.

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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1993_num_44_4_409481
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 44 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 821-834

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1993_num_44_4_409481
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/reco

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  1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
  2. Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Pierre Salmon, 1991. "Checks and balances and international openness," Post-Print hal-00445591, HAL.
  4. SALMON, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralization as an incentive scheme," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 98, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
  5. Jacques Le Cacheux & Laure Tourjansky, 1992. "Dix ans de décentralisation française : éléments de bilan," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(1), pages 151-193.
  6. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
  7. Pierre Salmon, 1993. "Unpopular Policies and the theory of representative democracy," Post-Print hal-00445592, HAL.
  8. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "The logic of pressure groups and the structure of the public sector," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 3(1-2), pages 55-86.
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