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Transfert de compétences et réallocation du capital social à la disposition des collectivités territoriales

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  • SALMON, Pierre

    (LATEC - CNRS URA 342 - Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

[eng] Transfer of powers and reallocation of the social capital available to junior governments. . The article starts from the assumption that the production of junior governments in sub­central jurisdictions such as the departement or the region is related both to the powers or resources that they receive from the central government and to the social capital which is available to them. A model is proposed in which both elements are considered as factors of production. The second being able to move only slowly across levels of jurisdiction, the central government is itself unable to transfer rapidly powers or resources from one level to another without running the risk of an efficiency loss of the whole which it would find unacceptable in terms of electoral support. [fre] Transfert de compétences et réallocation du capital social à la disposition des collectivités territoriales. . L'article part de l'hypothèse que la production de collectivités territoriales comme le département et la région dépend à la fois des compétences ou des res­sources qui leur sont attribuées par l'État et du capital social accumulé dont elles peuvent disposer. Un modèle est présenté dans lequel ces deux éléments sont considérés comme des facteurs de production. Le second ne pouvant passer d'une collectivité d'un certain niveau à une collectivité d'un autre niveau que lentement, l'État ne peut lui-même transférer rapidement des compétences ou des ressources d'un niveau à l'autre sans risquer une perte d'efficacité de l'ensemble qui serait, pour lui, électoralement inacceptable.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • SALMON, Pierre, 1993. "Transfert de compétences et réallocation du capital social à la disposition des collectivités territoriales," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1993-01, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
  • Handle: RePEc:lat:lateco:1993-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Jacques Le Cacheux & Laure Tourjansky, 1992. "Dix ans de décentralisation française : éléments de bilan," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(1), pages 151-193.
    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    4. SALMON, Pierre, 1991. "Unpopular Policies and the Theory of Representative Democracy," LATEC - Document de travail - Economie (1991-2003) 1991-02, LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne.
    5. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
    6. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    7. Pierre Salmon, 1991. "Checks and balances and international openness," Post-Print hal-00445591, HAL.
    8. Albert Breton & Gianluigi Galeotti & Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe, 1993. "Preferences and Democracy," Post-Print hal-00445588, HAL.
    9. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "The logic of pressure groups and the structure of the public sector," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 3(1-2), pages 55-86.
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