IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00861226.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cooperation among local governments to deliver public services: a "structural" bivariate response model with fixed effects and endogenous covariate

Author

Listed:
  • Edoardo Di Porto

    (EQUIPPE - Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales - PRES Université Lille Nord de France - Université de Lille, Droit et Santé)

  • Vincent Merlin

    (Economie publique et choix social - CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Sonia Paty

    () (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Cooperation among local governments has been encouraged to enable the aggregation of resources and improved public sector efficiency. However, if cooperation through the joint delivery of local public services is likely to be welfare enhancing for the agglomeration, but will lead to losses for one of the parties, it is unlikely that the losing municipality will cooperate. Using a unique panel dataset of 30,000 French municipalities for 1995-2003, we estimate the relationship between cooperation decision and the fiscal revenues raised to provide local public goods. We employ a new econometric strategy based on Lee (1978), developing a non linear method controlling for fixed effect, endogenous covariates and cluster standard error. We find evidence that a positive difference between the expected fiscal revenues of a cooperating locality and the actual revenues realized by an isolated locality significantly increases the probability of joining an inter-municipal community.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Edoardo Di Porto & Vincent Merlin & Sonia Paty, 2013. "Cooperation among local governments to deliver public services: a "structural" bivariate response model with fixed effects and endogenous covariate," Post-Print halshs-00861226, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00861226
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00861226
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cassette, Aurélie & Di Porto, Edoardo & Foremny, Dirk, 2012. "Strategic fiscal interaction across borders: Evidence from French and German local governments along the Rhine Valley," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 17-30.
    2. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    3. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
    4. Quentin Frère & Matthieu Leprince & Sonia Paty, 2014. "The Impact of Intermunicipal Cooperation on Local Public Spending," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 51(8), pages 1741-1760, June.
    5. Lorenz Blume & Tillmann Blume, 2007. "The economic effects of local authority mergers: empirical evidence for German city regions," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 41(3), pages 689-713, September.
    6. Eric Weese, 2011. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation," Working Papers 997, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    7. Reingewertz, Yaniv, 2012. "Do municipal amalgamations work? Evidence from municipalities in Israel," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 240-251.
    8. Salmon, Pierre, 1987. "Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 24-43, Summer.
    9. Miceli Thomas J., 1993. "The Decision to Regionalize in the Provision of Education: An Application of the Tiebout Model," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 344-360, May.
    10. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
    11. Brasington, David M., 1999. "Joint provision of public goods: the consolidation of school districts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 373-393, September.
    12. Rudie Hulst & André Montfort & Arto Haveri & Jenni Airaksinen & Josephine Kelly, 2009. "Institutional Shifts In Inter-Municipal Service Delivery," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 263-285, September.
    13. Papke, Leslie E., 2005. "The effects of spending on test pass rates: evidence from Michigan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 821-839, June.
    14. Sylvie Charlot & Sonia Paty & Virginie Piguet, 2015. "Does Fiscal Cooperation Increase Local Tax Rates in Urban Areas?," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(10), pages 1706-1721, October.
    15. Gordon, Nora & Knight, Brian, 2009. "A spatial merger estimator with an application to school district consolidation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 752-765, June.
    16. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
    17. Saarimaa, Tuukka & Tukiainen, Janne, 2010. "Coalition formation and political decision making: Evidence from Finnish municipal mergers," Working Papers 19, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    18. Rune Sørensen, 2006. "Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 75-95, April.
    19. Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 1995. "Selection corrections for panel data models under conditional mean independence assumptions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 115-132, July.
    20. Weese, Eric, 2011. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation," Center Discussion Papers 107268, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    21. Spolaore, Enrico, 2004. "Is small really so ugly?," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(03), pages 447-452, November.
    22. Hoyt, William H., 1991. "Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 123-131, July.
    23. Lee, Lung-Fei, 1978. "Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model with Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 19(2), pages 415-433, June.
    24. Rosenthal Stuart S. & Helsley Robert W., 1994. "Redevelopment and the Urban Land Price Gradient," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 182-200, March.
    25. Edoardo Di Porto & Federico Revelli, 2013. "Tax‐Limited Reaction Functions," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(5), pages 823-839, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:oup:jecgeo:v:17:y:2017:i:2:p:435-463. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Massimiliano Ferraresi & Giuseppe Migali & Leonzio Rizzo, 2017. "Does Inter-municipal Cooperation promote efficiency gains? Evidence from Italian Municipal," Working papers 59, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    3. Edoardo Di Porto & Angela Parenti & Sonia Paty & Zineb Abidi, 2017. "Local government cooperation at work: a control function approach," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 435-463.
    4. Christian Bergholz & Ivo Bischoff, 2016. "Local council members’ view on inter-municipal cooperation: Does office-related self interest matter?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201647, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. repec:taf:regstd:v:50:y:2016:i:11:p:1804-1818 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Allers, Maarten & van Ommeren, Bernard & Geertsema, Bieuwe, 2015. "Does intermunicipal cooperation create inefficiency? A comparison of interest rates paid by intermunicipal organizations, amalgamated municipalities and not recently amalgamated municipalities," Research Report 15003-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    7. Christian Bergholz & Ivo Bischoff, 2015. "Citizens‘ preferences for inter-municipal cooperation in rural areas: evidence from a survey in three Hessian counties," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201523, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    nter-municipal cooperation; fiscal revenues; bivariate response variable; panel data; endogeneity;

    JEL classification:

    • C3 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00861226. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.