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Local government cooperation at work: a control function approach

Author

Listed:
  • Edoardo Di Porto
  • Angela Parenti
  • Sonia Paty
  • Zineb Abidi

Abstract

We analyse voluntary coalition formation using a unique panel data for 1056 municipalities in the French region of Brittany between 1995 and 2002. We use a control function approach to develop a binary discrete choice model with spatial interactions. We find that a municipality’s decision to cooperate over the provision of local public goods depends on the decisions made by its neighbours. In particular, the probability of cooperating with neighbouring municipalities is higher if the latter already provide joint local public goods. This suggests that functional cooperation is likely to emerge due to a mimicking motivation and is poorly motivated by political alignment. The results are in line with the recent applied spatial economics literature but are derived for a discrete choice model setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Edoardo Di Porto & Angela Parenti & Sonia Paty & Zineb Abidi, 2017. "Local government cooperation at work: a control function approach," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 435-463.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jecgeo:v:17:y:2017:i:2:p:435-463.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lapointe, Simon, 2018. "“Love thy neighbour”? The effect of income and language differences on votes for municipal secessions," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 229-245.
    2. Massimiliano Ferraresi & Giuseppe Migali & Leonzio Rizzo, 2017. "Does Inter-municipal Cooperation promote efficiency gains? Evidence from Italian Municipal," Working papers 59, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    3. Blesse Sebastian & Rösel Felix, 2017. "Was bringen kommunale Gebietsreformen?: Kausale Evidenz zu Hoffnungen, Risiken und alternativen Instrumenten," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 18(4), pages 307-324, November.
    4. Ivo Bischoff & Eva Wolfschuetz, 2017. "The Emergence of Inter-Municipal Cooperation – A Hazard Model Approach," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201744, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    5. Daniel A. Brent & Katie Lorah, 2017. "The Geography of Civic Crowdfunding: Implications for Social Inequality and Donor-Project Dynamics," Departmental Working Papers 2017-09, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local governments; cooperation; control function approach; panel data;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • C3 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables

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