Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies
The formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two-stage noncooperative game. In the first stage, firms form associations in order to decrease their costs, and in the second stage they compete on the market. Examples of associations include R&D joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards. In equilibrium, the associations formed exhibit two general features: they are asymmetric and inefficient.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 26 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org |
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:autumn:p:537-556. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.