Competitive-Share Group Formation in Rent-Seeking Contests
The authors examine the possibility of forming a competitive-share group in rent-seeking contests. The competitive-share group has the following characteristics: the group is treated as a single player competing with the nonmembers to win the rent, the members choose their outlays noncooperatively, and the members compete to take larger shares of the rent. The authors show that the competitive-share group is always formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such group formation is that rent dissipation is less relative to individual rent seeking--in other words, the social cost associated with rent seeking is less. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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