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When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict

Author

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  • Francis Bloch

    ()

  • Santiago Sánchez-Pagés

    ()

  • Raphaël Soubeyran

Abstract

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in the general model of contests due to Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a contest among singletons. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Bloch & Santiago Sánchez-Pagés & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2006. "When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 3-29, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:3-29
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0099-9
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Anesi, 2009. "Moral hazard and free riding in collective action," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(2), pages 197-219, February.
    2. repec:oup:jecgeo:v:17:y:2017:i:2:p:435-463. is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Kai A. Konrad, 2011. "Strategie Aspects of Fighting in Alliances," Working Papers strategie_aspects_of_figh, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    4. Joshi, Sumit, 2008. "Endogenous formation of coalitions in a model of a race," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 62-85, January.
    5. Garfinkel, Michelle R., 2004. "Stable alliance formation in distributional conflict," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 829-852, November.
    6. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2011. "The Reasons for Wars: An Updated Survey," Chapters,in: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Herbst, Luisa & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2015. "Endogenous group formation in experimental contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 163-189.
    8. Joan Esteban, 2003. "Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 339-357, December.
    9. Michelle R. Garfinkel, 2004. "On the Stability of Group Formation: Managing the Conflict Within," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 21(1), pages 43-68, February.
    10. Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, 2007. "Endogenous coalition formation in contests," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(2), pages 139-163, September.
    11. Epstein, Gil S. & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2011. "Political culture and discrimination in contests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 88-93.
    12. Martin Kolmar & Andreas Wagener, 2010. "Inefficient Group Organization as Optimal Adaption to Dominant Environments," CESifo Working Paper Series 3157, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Edoardo Di Porto & Angela Parenti & Sonia Paty & Zineb Abidi, 2017. "Local government cooperation at work: a control function approach," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 435-463.
    14. Pelosse, Yohan, 2011. "Inter and intra-group conflicts as a foundation for contest success functions," MPRA Paper 31468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2009. "Civil War: A Review of Fifty Years of Research," Working Papers id:2231, eSocialSciences.
    16. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier.
    17. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    18. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2013. "Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2013-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    19. Guofu Tan & Ruqu Wang, 2010. "Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 273-299, March.
    20. Francis Bloch, 2009. "Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts," Working Papers hal-00435387, HAL.
    21. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
    22. Martin Kolmar & Andreas Wagener, 2013. "Inefficiency As A Strategic Device In Group Contests Against Dominant Opponents," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 2083-2095, October.

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