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Political Mergers as Coalition Formation: An Analysis of the Heisei Municipal Amalgamations

  • Eric Weese

    ()

    (Economic Growth Center, Yale University)

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    Due to moral hazard problems, municipal mergers in Japan did not result in as many amalgamations as a central planner would have chosen. The inefficiency of the decentralized mergers is calculated using structural parameter estimates based on observed mergers and actual national government policies. Estimation requires neither an equilibrium selection assumption nor the enumeration of all possible mergers.

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    File URL: http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp1022.pdf
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    Paper provided by Economic Growth Center, Yale University in its series Working Papers with number 1022.

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    Length: 58 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:egc:wpaper:1022
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    1. Ehlers, Lars, 2007. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 537-547, May.
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    7. Roth, Alvin, 2008. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions," Scholarly Articles 2579651, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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    11. Ariel Pakes, 2010. "Alternative models for moment inequalities," CeMMAP working papers CWP21/10, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    12. DIAMANTOUDI, Effrosyni & XUE, Licun, 2002. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 2002047, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    13. Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-56, November.
    14. Miceli Thomas J., 1993. "The Decision to Regionalize in the Provision of Education: An Application of the Tiebout Model," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 344-360, May.
    15. Gordon, Nora & Knight, Brian, 2009. "A spatial merger estimator with an application to school district consolidation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 752-765, June.
    16. Akihiko Kawaura, 2010. "Self-Serving Mayors and Local Government Consolidations in Japan," Working Papers 201014, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    17. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    18. Jeremy T. Fox, 2008. "Estimating Matching Games with Transfers," NBER Working Papers 14382, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
    20. repec:hrv:faseco:4553034 is not listed on IDEAS
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