Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems
The following properties of the core of a one-to-one matching problem are well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problems. We show that a set of matchings is a stable set of a one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties: (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; and (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b), and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.
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- Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
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