Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems
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- Ehlers, Lars, 2007. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 537-547, May.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2005. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems," Cahiers de recherche 2005-11, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
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More about this item
Keywords
matching problem; Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets;JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
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