Core Many-to-one Matchings by Fixed-point Methods
We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings.
|Date of creation:||13 Feb 2003|
|Note:||Type of Document - PDF; prepared on Linux PC; to print on PostScript; pages: 30|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1988. "Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 85-101, June.
- Ahmet Alkan, 2002. "A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(4), pages 737-746.
- Adachi, Hiroyuki, 2000. "On a characterization of stable matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 43-49, July.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541
- Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, February.
- Sotomayor, Marilda, 1999. "Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 55-70, July.
- Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
- Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge, 2000. "Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 91-105, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0302001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.