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Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions

Author

Listed:
  • Alvin E. Roth

    (Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260)

Abstract

The game-theoretic solution to certain job assignment problems allows the interests of agents on the same side of the market (e.g., firms or workers) to be simultaneously maximized. This is shown to follow from the lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes. However it is shown that in a more general class of problems the optimality results persist, but the lattice structures do not. Thus this paper raises as many questions as it answers.

Suggested Citation

  • Alvin E. Roth, 1985. "Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 379-389, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:10:y:1985:i:3:p:379-389
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.10.3.379
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    Cited by:

    1. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
    2. repec:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:104-111 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005. "Matching with Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
    4. John W. Hatfield & Paul Milgrom, 2005. "Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000780, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Aron Matskin & Daniel Lehmann, 2009. "General Matching: Lattice Structure of the Set of Agreements," Discussion Paper Series dp501, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    6. repec:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:201-211 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito, 2010. "Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1704-1723, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    job assignment; job matching; market games;

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