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The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings

Author

Listed:
  • Agustín Bonifacio

    (Universidad Nacional de San Luis / CONICET)

  • Nadia Guiñazú

    (Universidad Nacional de San Luis / CONICET)

  • Noelia Juarez

    (Universidad Nacional de San Luis / CONICET)

  • Pablo Neme

    (Universidad Nacional de San Luis / CONICET)

  • Jorge Oviedo

    (Universidad Nacional de San Luis / CONICET)

Abstract

In a many-to-one matching model, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings when firms' preferences satisfy substitutability. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed worker. We show that this set has a lattice structure and define a Tarski operator on this lattice that models a re-equilibration process and has the set of stable matchings as its fixed points.

Suggested Citation

  • Agustín Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2021. "The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings," Working Papers 64, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:64
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    Cited by:

    1. Yi-You Yang, 2025. "On the existence of stable matchings with contracts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 98(3), pages 367-372, May.
    2. Agustin G. Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2024. "The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 113-134, February.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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