The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
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- Agustín G. Bonifacio & Nadia Guiñazú & Noelia Juarez & Pablo Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2022. "The Lattice of Envy-Free Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts," Working Papers 155, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
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