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The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update

Author

Listed:
  • Elena Iñarra
  • Roberto Serrano
  • Ken-Ichi Shimomura

Abstract

One of the many important contributions in David Schmeidler?s distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus.?This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. JEL?Codes:?C71,?C72.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Iñarra & Roberto Serrano & Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 2020. "The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 71(2), pages 225-266.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_712_0225
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    nucleolus; kernel; bargaining set;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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