Intermediate Preferences and Stable Coalition Structures
This paper models two forces that are at work to explain the formation of coalitions: The increasing power of the coalitions which incites to cooperate, the heterogeneity of the agents which leads to the formation of subgroups. We show that the interaction of these two forces results, under an intermediate preferences assumption, in the formation of coalitions that partition the society in a stable way.
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|Date of creation:||1991|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1994, pp. 45-48|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 48 boulevard Jourdan - 75014 Paris|
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