Categorical Segregation from a Game Theoretical Approach
This paper exploits a coalition formation game with incomplete information to illustrate the causal relationship between categorical thinking and segregation. This causality was suggested by Fryer and Jackson (2008). The present model shows how societies can be segregated even when its self-interested members have no a priori motivation to discriminate by social identity; consequently, this paper supports the argument that segregation may not be malevolent in origin.
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