Limited Observation in Mutual Consent Networks
This paper studies mutual consent social networks in which individuals imperfectly monitor others' network ties and have incomplete information about the benefits of network participation. I introduce the Conjectural Pairwise Stability concept, which generalizes Jackson and Wolinsky's (1996) Pairwise Stability concept to allow for limited observation, and apply it to a specific mutual consent network formation game. While limited observation generally leads to the existence of less efficient stable networks, I find that it can also lead to the existence of efficient stable networks. Moreover, stability restrictions considered in previous work lose their refining power as observation becomes more limited.
Volume (Year): 6 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
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