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A Market for Connections

  • Topi Miettinen
  • Panu Poutvaara

    ()

Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the spoils may invest in a good relationship with the deciding agents in order to be remembered when the nomination is made. In this paper, we analyze such markets for connections in the presence of convex costs of networking.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3810.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3810
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  18. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
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