IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiucen/3b5b6726-b55b-4959-80d5-cb4afcf6899b.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Games Played Through Agents

Author

Listed:
  • Prat, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Rustichini, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the agent. We characterize pure-strategy equilibria and we provide conditions-in terms of game balancedness-for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent. Copyright The Econometric Society 2003.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Prat, A. & Rustichini, A., 1999. "Games Played Through Agents," Discussion Paper 1999-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:3b5b6726-b55b-4959-80d5-cb4afcf6899b
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1154041/PARA5616755.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; principal agent theory;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:3b5b6726-b55b-4959-80d5-cb4afcf6899b. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman). General contact details of provider: http://center.uvt.nl .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.