Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous and Nonconvex Games

This paper investigates the existence of pure strategy, dominant-strategy, and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous and nonconvex games. We introduce a new notion of very weak continuity, called weak transfer continuity, which holds in a large class of discontinuous economic games and is easy to check. We show that it, together with the compactness of strategy space and the quasiconcavity of payoff functions, permits the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our equilibrium existence result neither implies nor is implied by the existing results in the literature such as those in Baye et al. [1993] and Reny [1999]. We provide sufficient conditions for weak transfer continuity by introducing notions of weak transfer upper continuity and weak transfer lower continuity. These conditions are satisfied in many economic games and are often quite simple to check. We also introduce the notion of weak dominant transfer upper continuity, and use it to study the existence of dominant strategy equilibria. We then generalize these results and those in Baye et al. [1993] and Reny [1999] without assuming any form of quasi-concavity of payoff functions or convexity of strategy spaces.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)