A Short Proof of Reny's Existence Theorem for Payoff Secure Games
A short proof of Reny (1999)'s equilibrium existence theorem for payoff secure games is provided. At the heart of the proof lies the concept of a multivalued mapping with the local intersection property. By means of the Fan-Browder collective fixed-point theorem, we show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem which covers a number of known games. Reny's theorem follows from it straightforwardly.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2008|
|Note:||Published in Economic Theory DOI 10.1007/s00199-010-0526-1S|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Str. Dmytrivska, 92-94, 4th Floor, office 404, Kyiv, 01135|
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- Michael R. Baye & Guoqiang Tian & Jianxin Zhou, 1993. "Characterizations of the Existence of Equilibria in Games with Discontinuous and Non-quasiconcave Payoffs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 935-948.
- Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Page Jr, Frank H., 2007. "Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 566-575, May.
- Adib Bagh & Alejandro Jofre, 2006. "Reciprocal Upper Semicontinuity and Better Reply Secure Games: A Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1715-1721, November.
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