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Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment

In: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9

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  • Joseph Farrell

Abstract

Intellectual property policy relies on bargaining in the shadow of exclusivity. But bargaining is generically less than fully efficient, and the bargaining that would be needed to reach efficient arrangements in the shadow of exclusivity may be especially difficult in certain ways. I explore these issues and illustrate with brief discussions of patent pools and standards organizations, among others.
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Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Farrell, 2009. "Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, pages 39-53, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:8183
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yarrow, George K, 1985. "Shareholder Protection, Compulsory Acquisition and the Efficiency of the Takeover Process," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 3-16, September.
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    3. Benjamin Chiao & Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2007. "The rules of standard-setting organizations: an empirical analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 905-930, December.
    4. Michael D. Whinston & Ilya R. Segal, 2000. "Naked Exclusion: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 296-309, March.
    5. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt8vg425vj, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    6. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting with Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388.
    7. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2000. "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 603-633, Winter.
    8. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-1369, September.
    9. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter.
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