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Self-Serving Mayors and Local Government Consolidations in Japan

Author

Listed:
  • Akihiko Kawaura

    (Doshisha University, Department of Policy Studies)

Abstract

This paper investigates local government consolidations with a focus on public choice aspects in the decision-making. Politicians could lose future payoffs if their locality merges with a larger counterpart, and they may sabotage the merger process. The analysis with data from 3,212 Japanese municipalities reveals that a long-serving mayor would present an obstacle to consolidation.

Suggested Citation

  • Akihiko Kawaura, 2010. "Self-Serving Mayors and Local Government Consolidations in Japan," Working Papers 201014, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:201014
    as

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    File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_10-14.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Veiga, Linda G. & Veiga, Francisco Jose, 2007. "Does opportunism pay off?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 177-182, August.
    2. Deller, Steven C & Rudnicki, Edward, 1992. "Managerial Efficiency in Local Government: Implications on Jurisdictional Consolidation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 221-231, September.
    3. Martial Foucault & Thierry Madies & Sonia Paty, 2008. "Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 57-80, October.
    4. Sergio Sakurai & Naercio Menezes-Filho, 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 301-314, October.
    5. Linda Veiga & Francisco Veiga, 2007. "Political business cycles at the municipal level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 45-64, April.
    6. Wittman, Donald, 1991. "Nations and States: Mergers and Acquisitions; Dissolutions and Divorce," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 126-129, May.
    7. Coelho, Cesar & Veiga, Francisco Jose & Veiga, Linda G., 2006. "Political business cycles in local employment: Evidence from Portugal," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 82-87, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Weese, 2015. "Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), pages 257-307, July.
    2. Anthony S. Rausch, 2014. "Japan's Heisei municipal mergers and the contradictions of neo-liberal administrative planning," Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(2), pages 135-149, June.
    3. Hirota, Haruaki & Yunoue, Hideo, 2017. "Evaluation of the fiscal effect on municipal mergers: Quasi-experimental evidence from Japanese municipal data," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 132-149.
    4. Hirota, Haruaki & Yunoue, Hideo, 2011. "Municipal mergers and special provisions of local council members in Japan," MPRA Paper 37485, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Saito, Hitoshi & Hirota, Haruaki & Yunoue, Hideo & Miyaki, Miki, 2017. "Does municipal mergers internalize spatial spillover effects? Empirical evidence from Japanese municipalities," MPRA Paper 76833, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    local government; mayor; incentives; merger; public choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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