Economic Voting in Portuguese Municipal Elections
This paper analyses the impact of economic conditions on Portuguese local electoral outcomes. We use two extensive datasets to estimate an economic voting model which accounts for the possibility that different levels of government have different levels of responsibility for economic outcomes and for clarity of government responsibility. Empirical results indicate that the performance of the national economy is important especially if local governments are of the same party as the central government. The municipal situation is also relevant particularly in scenarios of higher clarity of government responsibility
|Date of creation:||Oct 2010|
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|Publication status:||Published in Public Choice 155: 317-334, 2013.|
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