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Economic Voting in Portuguese Municipal Elections

Author

Listed:
  • Rodrigo Martins

    () (Universidade de Coimbra / GEMF)

  • Francisco José Veiga

    (Universidade do Minho)

Abstract

This paper analyses the impact of economic conditions on Portuguese local electoral outcomes. We use two extensive datasets to estimate an economic voting model which accounts for the possibility that different levels of government have different levels of responsibility for economic outcomes and for clarity of government responsibility. Empirical results indicate that the performance of the national economy is important especially if local governments are of the same party as the central government. The municipal situation is also relevant particularly in scenarios of higher clarity of government responsibility

Suggested Citation

  • Rodrigo Martins & Francisco José Veiga, 2010. "Economic Voting in Portuguese Municipal Elections," GEMF Working Papers 2011-03, GEMF, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra.
  • Handle: RePEc:gmf:wpaper:2011-03
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    File URL: http://gemf.fe.uc.pt/workingpapers/pdf/2011/gemf_2011-03.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Economou, Athina & Gavroglou, Stavros & Kollias, Christos, 2013. "Economic fluctuations and political self-placement," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 57-65.
    2. Aurélie Cassette & Etienne Farvaque & Jérôme Héricourt, 2013. "Two-round elections, one-round determinants? Evidence from the French municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 563-591, September.
    3. Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2013. "Voting functions in the EU-15," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 411-428, December.
    4. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2016. "Voting and Popularity," CREMA Working Paper Series 2016-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    5. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2013. "Running for office again: evidence from Portuguese municipal elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 677-702, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local governments; Elections; Portugal; Voting; Economic conditions;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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