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A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

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Abstract

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 656.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:656.05
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    Cited by:

    1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    2. Eric Weese, 2015. "Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), pages 257-307, July.
    3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "One-deviation principle in coalition formation," Discussion Papers 35, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    4. Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Kosfeld, Michael, 2005. "Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 1641, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Weese, Eric, 2008. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation : Evidence from Japanese Municipal Amalgamations," CCES Discussion Paper Series 5, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    6. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    7. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
    8. Tania Singer & Ernst Fehr, 2005. "The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 340-345, May.
    9. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Dynamic stable set," Discussion Papers 33, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    10. Eric Weese, 2011. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation," Working Papers 997, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    11. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2009. "Strategy-proof coalition formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, November.
    12. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Christian Zehnder, "undated". "The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages," IEW - Working Papers 247, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    13. Casajus, André, 2008. "On the stability of coalition structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 271-274, August.
    14. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
    15. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Özbilen, Seçkin, 2025. "Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 16-52.

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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