Dynamic stable set
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References listed on IDEAS
- Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
- Dutta, Bhaskar, 1988. "Covering sets and a new condorcet choice correspondence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 63-80, February.
- Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2007.
"A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games,"
Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 85-90, April.
- Salvador Barberï¿½ & Anke Gerber, "undated". "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," IEW - Working Papers 238, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 248, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 656.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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- Anindya Bhattacharya & Victoria Brosi, 2011. "An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 393-401, May.
More about this item
KeywordsvNM stable set; dynamic; history;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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