Dynamic stable set
We study a dynamic vNM stable set in a compact metric space under the assumption of complete and continuous dominance relation. Internal and external stability are defined with respect to farsighted dominance. Stability of an outcome is conditioned on the history via which it is reached. A dynamic stable set always exists. Any covering set by Dutta (1988) coincides with the set of outcomes that are implementable via a dynamic stable set. The maximal implementable outcome set is a version of the ultimate uncovered set.
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- Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2007.
"A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games,"
Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 85-90, April.
- Salvador Barberï¿½ & Anke Gerber, "undated". "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," IEW - Working Papers 238, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 656.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 248, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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