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Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly "Lumpy" public goods

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  • Kawasaki, Ryo
  • Muto, Shigeo

Abstract

We examine farsighted stable sets in a public good provision game where the public good is perfectly "lumpy" as defined by Taylor [Taylor, M., 1987. The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge]. In this case, Taylor argues that the game is not a prisoners' dilemma game. While Suzuki and Muto [Suzuki, A., Muto, S., 2005. Farsighted stability in an n-Person Prisoner's dilemma. International Journal of Game Theory 33, 431-445] have shown that almost all outcomes included in a farsighted stable set of a prisoners' dilemma game are Pareto efficient, we show in our game that almost all strictly individually rational outcomes are included in a farsighted stable set, including those that are not Pareto efficient.

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  • Kawasaki, Ryo & Muto, Shigeo, 2009. "Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly "Lumpy" public goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 98-109, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:58:y:2009:i:1:p:98-109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
    2. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
    3. Okada, Akira, 1993. "The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 629-656, November.
    4. Akihiro Suzuki & Shigeo Muto, 2005. "Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 431-445, September.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Toshiyuki Hirai, 2018. "Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1087-1111, November.
    2. Kawasaki, Ryo, 2015. "Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable sets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 8-12.
    3. Shino, Junnosuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2012. "Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling’s location games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 23-30.
    4. Kawasaki, Ryo & Sato, Takashi & Muto, Shigeo, 2015. "Farsightedly stable tariffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 118-124.

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