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Networks and Farsighted Stability

  • Frank H. Page Jr.
  • Myrna H. Wooders
  • Samir Kamat

The main contribution of this paper is to provide a framework in which the notion of farsighted stability for games, introduced by Chwe (1994), can be applied to direct networks. Then using Chwe's basic result on the nonemptiness of farsighted stable sets for games, we show that for any given collection of directed networks and any given collection of rules governing network formation, there exists a farsighted stable directed network.

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Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 with number 370.

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Date of creation: 01 Jul 2002
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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf2:370
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  1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1996. "Stable Networks," Working Papers 971, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Watts, Alison, 2002. "Non-myopic formation of circle networks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 277-282, January.
  3. Li, Shuhe, 1992. "Far-sighted strong equilibrium and oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 39-44, September.
  4. Page Jr, Frank H & Wooders, Myrna H & Kamat, Samir, 2001. "Networks And Farsighted Stability," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 621, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Watts, Alison, 2001. "A Dynamic Model of Network Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 331-341, February.
  6. Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
  7. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
  8. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 678-84, Part I Se.
  10. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2003. "Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2003.52, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  11. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
  12. Bhaskar Dutta & Sayantan Ghosal & Debraj Ray, 2004. "Farsighted Network Formation," Working papers 122, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  13. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, EconWPA.
  14. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
  15. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
  16. BHATTACHARYA, Anindya & ZIAD, Abderrahmane, 2003. "On conservative stable standard of behaviour in situations with perfect foresight," CORE Discussion Papers 2003049, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Deroian, Frederic, 2003. "Farsighted strategies in the formation of a communication network," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 343-349, September.
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