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Network formation with heterogeneous agents and absolute friction

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  • J. VANDENBOSSCHE

    ()

  • T. DEMUYNCK
  • -

Abstract

We present a model of endogenous network formation with absolute friction and heterogeneous agents. The individual payoffs from a given network are determined by the difference of an agent specific utility function that depends on the number of his/her direct links and the sum of his/her link-costs. These link-costs decompose in a symmetric function that represents the social and geographical distance between the two agents and an agent specific function representing the partner’s wealth and status. From a theoretical point of view, we define a new stability concept that is situated between the notions of pairwise stability (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) and strong stability (see Dutta and Mutuswami (1997)). We show that our model has a unique stable network and we demonstrate that it is also strongly stable. As such, we provide uniqueness and existence for a whole range of stability concepts situated between our new stability concept and strong stability. From a practical point of view, we provide an algorithm that reproduces this stable network from information on the individual payoff structure. We illustrate the use of this algorithm by applying it to an informal insurance data set from the village of Nyakatoke in rural Tanzania.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Vandenbossche & T. Demuynck & -, 2010. "Network formation with heterogeneous agents and absolute friction," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 10/642, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  • Handle: RePEc:rug:rugwps:10/642
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rong, Rong & Houser, Daniel, 2015. "Growing stars: A laboratory analysis of network formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 380-394.
    2. Heydari, Babak & Mosleh, Mohsen & Dalili, Kia, 2015. "Efficient Network Structures with Separable Heterogeneous Connection Costs," MPRA Paper 63968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Margherita Comola & Marcel Fafchamps, 2017. "The Missing Transfers: Estimating Misreporting in Dyadic Data," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(3), pages 549-582.
    4. Comola, Margherita & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2014. "Estimating Mis-reporting in Dyadic Data: Are Transfers Mutually Beneficial?," IZA Discussion Papers 8664, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. Arcand, Jean-Louis & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2012. "Matching in community-based organizations," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 203-219.
    6. Margherita Comola & Mariapia Mendola, 2013. "The Formation of Migrant Networks," Development Working Papers 353, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    7. Berardi, Simone & Tedeschi, Gabriele, 2017. "From banks' strategies to financial (in)stability," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 255-272.
    8. Heydari, Babak & Mosleh, Mohsen & Dalili, Kia, 2015. "Efficient network structures with separable heterogeneous connection costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 82-85.
    9. Margherita Comola & Marcel Fafchamps, 2015. "An Experimental Study of Decentralized Link Formation with Competition," NBER Working Papers 21758, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Gabriele Tedeschi & Stefania Vitali & Mauro Gallegati, 2014. "The dynamic of innovation networks: a switching model on technological change," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 817-834, September.
    11. Babak Heydari & Mohsen Mosleh & Kia Dalili, 2015. "Efficient Network Structures with Separable Heterogeneous Connection Costs," Papers 1504.06634, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2015.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    network formation; heterogeneity; absolute friction;

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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