IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Self-Organization in Communication Networks

  • Bala, V.
  • Goyal, S.

We develop a dynamic model to study the formation of communication networks. In this model, individuals periodically make decisions concerning the continuation of existing information links and the formation of new information links, with their cohorts. These decisions trade off the costs of forming and maintaining links against the potential rewards from doing so. We analyze the long run behavior of this process of link formation and dissolution. Our results establish that this process always self-organizes, i.e., irrespective of the number of agents, and the initial network, the dynamic process converges to a limit social communication network with probability one. Furthermore, we prove that the limiting network is invariably either a wheel network or the empty network. We show in the (corresponding) static network formation game that, while a variety of architectures can be sustained in equilibrium, the wheel is the unique efficient architecture for the interesting class of parameters. Thus, our results imply that the dynamics have strong equilibrium selection properties.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://repub.eur.nl/pub/1415/eeb19960111120063.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute in its series Econometric Institute Research Papers with number EI 9713-/A.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ems:eureir:1415
Contact details of provider: Postal: Postbus 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam
Phone: 31 10 4081111
Web page: http://www.eur.nl/ese

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  2. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1996. "A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1375-93, November.
  3. A. Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 425, David K. Levine.
  4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1997. "Stable Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 322-344, October.
    • Dutta, Bhaskar & Mutuswami, Suresh, 1996. "Stable Networks," Working Papers 971, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September.
  6. Stef Tijs & Anne van den Nouweland & Bhaskar Dutta, 1998. "Link formation in cooperative situations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 245-256.
  7. Mailath, George J., 1992. "Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-277, August.
  8. Anderlini, Luca & Ianni, Antonella, 1996. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-177, April.
  9. Hendricks, Ken & Piccione, Michele & Tan, Guofu, 1995. "The Economics of Hubs: The Case of Monopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 83-99, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ems:eureir:1415. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RePub)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.