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Friendship Networks

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  • Jan K. Brueckner

Abstract

Building upon a long tradition in sociology, economists have recently turned their attention to the analysis of social networks. The present paper adds to this emerging literature by proposing a different approach to social-network formation. As in the model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), formation of a link between two individuals requires two-sided investments in the present framework. But in contrast to their approach, where the required investments are exogenously specified and link formation is deterministic, the level of individual investment is a decision variable in the present model and link formation is stochastic. Thus, the probability that a link is formed between two individuals depends on the ``effort" both agents devote to creating the link. These effort levels are chosen noncooperatively via Nash behavior. As in the Jackson-Wolinsky model, indirect links are worth less than direct linkages to other individuals. But, in contrast to their assumption of a smooth benefit decay as link distance increases, the present framework assumes that benefits are zero when more than two links are involved. The model can be viewed as a portrayal of friendship networks. For two individuals to form a friendship, each must exert effort, which could involve inviting the other person to dinner at his house, arranging other types of social outings, or buying gifts on special occasions. Effort creates ``direct" friendships, and the combination of such links leads to ``indirect" friendships. Concretely, a particular individual may invite all of his direct friends to a dinner party at his house, and through socializing with one another, these people enjoy indirect friendships. The paper analyzes the effort externalities that are present in the model, showing the effort levels are universally too low. In addition, the analysis explores the effect of several types of asymmetries on the network structure, as reflected in effort levels and the probability of link formation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan K. Brueckner, 2004. "Friendship Networks," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 184, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:nawm04:184
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Job matching, social network and word-of-mouth communication," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 500-522, May.
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    6. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
    7. Scott A. Boorman, 1975. "A Combinatorial Optimization Model for Transmission of Job Information through Contact Networks," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 216-249, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gil S. Epstein & Odelia Heizler (Cohen), 2016. "The formation of networks in the diaspora," International Journal of Manpower, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 37(7), pages 1136-1153, October.
    2. Aditi Roy & Sudipta Sarangi, 2009. "Revisiting Friendship Networks," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 2640-2647.
    3. Helsley, Robert W. & Zenou, Yves, 2014. "Social networks and interactions in cities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 426-466.
    4. Gil S. Epstein & Odelia Heizler (Cohen), 2016. "Networks in the Diaspora," RF Berlin - CReAM Discussion Paper Series 1604, Rockwool Foundation Berlin (RF Berlin) - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM).
    5. Joost Vandenbossche & Thomas Demuynck, 2013. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Agents and Absolute Friction," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 42(1), pages 23-45, June.
    6. Jan K. Brueckner & Oleg Smirnov, 2007. "Workings Of The Melting Pot: Social Networks And The Evolution Of Population Attributes," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 209-228, May.
    7. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Communication networks with endogenous link strength," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, May.
    8. Jun Oshiro, 2017. "Solitary City: Time, Space and Urban Policy," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(6), pages 744-764, December.
    9. Konovalov, Alexander, 2014. "Competition and Cooperation in Network Games," Working Papers in Economics 583, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social networks;

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior

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