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Choosing `Me' and `My Friends': Identity in a Non-Cooperative Network Formation Game with Cost Sharing

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  • Dev, Pritha

Abstract

This paper introduces the choice of identity characteristics, and, commitments to these characteristics, in a network formation model where links costs are shared. Players want to link to the largest group given that linking costs are decreasing (increasing) in commitments for same (different) identity. We study conditions under which these choices allow for networks with multiple identities. We find that whether the choice of identity itself gives any utility or not, there will be Nash networks featuring multiple identities. Moreover, if the choice of identity directly adds utility, networks with multiple identities will be efficient and survive the dynamic process.

Suggested Citation

  • Dev, Pritha, 2010. "Choosing `Me' and `My Friends': Identity in a Non-Cooperative Network Formation Game with Cost Sharing," MPRA Paper 21631, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:21631
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Identity; Network Formation; Cost Sharing Links;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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