IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v29y2000i3p339-357.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Licun Xue

    () (Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark)

Abstract

This paper defines "negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium'', a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. It recognizes the possibility that a group of self-interested players may choose, voluntarily and without binding agreement, to coordinate their choice of strategies and make joint objections; moreover, it takes the perfect foresight of rational players fully into account. The merit of the notion of negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium is twofold: (1) It offers a way to rectify the nestedness assumption and myopia embedded in the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. (2) The negotiation process is formalized by a "graph", which serves as a natural extension to the approach that models preplay communication by an extensive game.

Suggested Citation

  • Licun Xue, 2000. "Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 339-357.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:3:p:339-357 Note: Received: October 1998/Final version: May 2000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/papers/0029003/00290339.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
    2. Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996. "Admissibility and Common Knowledge," Discussion Paper 1996-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nessah, Rabia & Tazdaı¨t, Tarik, 2013. "Absolute optimal solution for a compact and convex game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 224(2), pages 353-361.
    2. Takashi Kamihigashi & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2017. "Organizational Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series DP2017-25, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    3. Bardhan, Pranab & Singh, Nirvikar, 2004. "Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1mg8p7tc, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    4. Nicholas Ziros, 2011. "Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 14-2011, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    5. repec:spr:etbull:v:1:y:2013:i:1:d:10.1007_s40505-013-0011-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Nikolaj Malchow-Moeller & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, "undated". "A Dynamic Agricultural Household Model with Uncertain Income and Irreversible and Indivisible Investments under Credit Constraints," Economics Working Papers 2000-7, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    7. Heller, Yuval, 2008. "Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilbrium," MPRA Paper 7717, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Mar 2008.
    8. Daniel Granot & Greys Sov{s}i'{c}, 2005. "Formation of Alliances in Internet-Based Supply Exchanges," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 92-105.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    coalition; negotiation; Nash equilibrium; self-enforcing agreement; perfect foresight;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:3:p:339-357. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.